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CASE COMMENTS
because of the provision for a delivery in person. The case of O'Neal
v. Sovereign Woodmen? squarely holds that delivery to the "camp" of
a fraternal insurance organization is sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment that delivery of the policy be to the applicant in person. How-
ever, the court was probably correct in the principal case in giving the
ordinary meaning to the phase "in person". The O'Neal case should
be confined to its exact facts.
It is unfortunate that the court should have based its decision so
strongly upon the £nedeker case, for it may lead to the false inference
that where the application provides for delivery of the policy and full
payment of the first premium before liability shall attach: (1) liability
will never attach upon delivery to the agent; (2) liability will never
attach where the first premium has not been fully paid. Such an infer-
ence would be entirely erroneous. It must be emphasized that the prin-
cipal case goes no further than to confine the rule of the McC-uire case
in narrow limits. In reverting to the older cases for its precedents, the
court reverses a trend towards making a manual delivery of the policy
to the insured unnecessary. Though somewhat unfortunate in its cita-
tion of precedents, the decision is not illogical. The fine distinction
drawn between this and the McGuire case serves to reconcile to some
degree the two lines of decisions in Kentucky which have caused so
much confusion upon this question. Where the policy expressly
requires a delivery of the policy to the insured in person, payment of
the remainder of the premium will be considered as "something for the
insured to do to make the insurance effective". But since the McGuire
case is not overruled, where there is no express provision for delivery
in person, liability may attach upon delivery to the agent and before
payment of the remainder of the first premium, where the insured has
expressed a readiness to pay. 0 M. FEUSN.
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION FOR PENSION AGREEMENT.
Plaintiff employees of defendant company were retired from active
duty with a promise that they would be carried on the company pay-
roll at half-pay. The payments were to continue until death, according
to evidence of plaintiffs, whose only duty was to be to call semi-monthly
for their checks at the company's main office. After paying the pen
sion for nearly a year, defendant discontinued it. Held: no binding
contract existed to pay a life pension, since there was no valid and
sufficient consideration. Plowman et al. v. Indian Refining Co., 20
F. Sup. 1 (E. D. Ill., 1937).
The court rejected plaintiffs' theory that the past service afforded
sufficient consideration,' either of itself or as creating a "moral obliga-
tion" or a sense of "appreciation" which could support the employer's
'130 Ky. 68, 113 S. W. 52 (1908). See also Central Life Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 165 Ky. 296, 176 S. W. 1139 (1915).
'Holland v. Barnes, 117 Ga. 504, 43 S. E. 732 (1903); Willingham
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promise. The past services, the court pointed out, were without refer-
ence to the promise, and not given in exchange for or in reliance on the
promise. And neither moral obligation2 nor the motive of the prom-
isor 3 can supply the want of "legal" consideration. The duty of call-
ing for the check semi-monthly was likewise rejected as consideration,
because it was only a condition imposed for obtaining a gratuity.'
As a purely legal question the answer was obvious, in this case, as
the court remarked. The decision is supported by the overwhelming
weight of authority. The opinion is interesting, however, in the
court's recognition of the social desirability of workers' pensions paid
by the industry,5 and a possible dissatisfaction on the part of the court
Sash and Door Co. v. Drew, 117 Ga. 850, 45 S. E. 237 (1903); Meginnes
v. McChesney, 179 Iowa 563, 160 N. W. 50 (1917); In re Fisher's Estate,
128 Ore. 415, 274 Pac. 1098 (1929); Fisher v. Harrisburg Gas Co.,
1 Pearson (Pa.) 118 (1857); Hill v. Granat, 134 N. Y. S. 529 (1912);
Shear v. Harrington, 262 S. W. 150 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924); Innes v.
East Indies Co., 2 Jur. (N. S.) 189 (1856); Re Birbeck Permanent
Benefit Building Society (1913), 1 Ch. 400. The same principle is
applied in contracts of sale: Roscarla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234 (1842)
(English leading case). But cf. Langer v. Superior Steel Corp.,
Pa. Sup. Ct. 597, 161 Atl. 571 (1932), and Greenup v. Wilhoite, 212 Ky.
465, 279 S. W. 665 (1926) (a so-called "housekeeper case"). 1 Williston,
Contracts (rev. ed., 1936), See. 142; Restatement, Contracts (1932),
Sec. 75.
21 Williston, Contracts, See. 148: "The law in most of the United
States, as in England, has rejected the principle of moral considera-
tion." Even if this were not true, the principle case seems hardly to
fall into any of the once accepted types of moral consideration. The
suggestion that one has a strong moral obligation to pay a pension to
his former employees would probably meet with considerable opposi-
tion in the courts even at this late date, despite the recent advances
of the social security concept.
2 Shear v. Harrington, 266 S. W. 554 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924) (Offer
based on "kindly feeling and generous impulse growing out of recog-
nition of long and faithful services was based on motive and not on
consideration, and cannot be enforced in court.") 1 Williston, Con-
tracts, Sec. 111: ". . . if there be no legal consideration, no motive
such as ... a desire to do justice ... will support a promise."
4Williston, Contracts, Sec. 112. Kirksey v. Kirksey, S Ala. 131
(1845), is a leading case in the United States. The "duty" in the prin-
cipal case of calling for the checks was clearly a condition for a
gratuity, not consideration, as witnessed by the fact that in some
instances the checks were mailed to the plaintiffs. Cf. Langer v.
Superior Steel Co., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Atl. 571 (1932) (where
a promise to pay a pension on condition that employee did not engage
in competition and "remained loyal" was held enforceable. Consid-
eration in this case was of the peppercorn variety and the court had
to search to find that. To buttress the holding the court threw in the
doctrine of promissory estoppel for good measure, In the average
case of retirement of a worn-out and superannuated employee an
expressed consideration that he not engage in competition would be
in the nature of a fictitious, if not imaginary, consideration; remaining
loyal is entirely subjective; and promissory estoppel would seldom be
applicable).
r20 F. Supp. 1, 5. "In this enlightened day, no one controverts the
wisdom, justice, and desirability of a policy - . . looking to promotion
and assurance of financial protection of deserving employees in their old
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with the result of the case. For no matter how desirable pensions In
industry may be, they will never be legally enforcible in the absence
of statute or stipulation in an employment contract (both of which
are at present almost non-existent in industry generally) so long as
we must satisfy the requirement of consideration to make a valid
contract. 6
The pensions, in this type of case, are essentially a gift, and if
they were paid in a lump sum there would be no question of their
validity. No basis in principle exists for a distinction that will not
allow an employer to make a promise to pay a pension in monthly in-
stallments which would be equally enforceableJ
In a commercial and industrial age, as Pound has pointed out,
promises form the greater part of wealth.8 It might be advisable then,
in an age of wealth based largely on promises, to revise and extend
principles of law set out in an age of wealth based principally on goods.
And the requirement of consideration, once accepted almost without
question as essential to the idea of contract, might be discarded alto-
gether. The great systems of law other than our own function without
anything that resembles consideration, and even in Anglo-American
jurisprudence numerous exceptions exist where the idea of considera-
tion is dispensed with altogether."
It would seem desirable that as long as one party wishes to enter
Into an agreement with another party to be legally bound to that party
to do something or give something which is not against public policy
age.., the industry wherein the diligent worker labors for many years
should bear the cost of his living in some degree of comfort through
his declining years."
1 In jurisdictions in which the seal retains its common law effec-
tiveness, it would be theoretically possible to establish an enforceable
pension agreement under a specialty, but the seal has been largely abol-
ished in the United States.
I Cf., Pound, Consideration in Equity (1919), 13 Ill. L. R. 667, 692.
. . . there is a vital difference between 'I give you' and 'I hold in
trust for you', one accomplishing nothing and the other doing its work
completely ... this situation may well put us on inquiry whether and
how long such a condition, in that part of our legal system which
touches credit and commerce and our whole structure most immediately
is to be endured."
' "An important part of everyone's substance consists of advantages
which others have promised to provide for or render to him." Pound,
Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922), 236.
' "The most recent civil codes-those of Brazil, Germany, Japan,
and Switzerland-omit all reference to the requirement of a causa or a
consideration for the validity of contracts." Lorenzen, Cause and
Consideration in the Law of Contracts (1919), 28 Yale L. J. 621, 642.
"A cause or motive for the contract is required in the French Code, but
as a spirit of liberality or the 'satisfaction of a sentiment of gen-
erosity' Is sufficient cause the requirement amounts simply to an
inhibition of agreements based on illegality, mistake, or fraud." Wil-
liston, Contracts, Sec. 4. The same is true of the codes based on the
French-such as those of the Spanish speaking nations and of Italy.
" Hulvey, The Doctrine of Consideration (1937), 42 Com. L. J. 184;
Goble, Trends in the Theories of Contracts in the United States (1937),
11 Tul. L. R. 412.
K. L. J.-8
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and involves no fraud or mistake then the law should give the agree-
ment legal effect. Consideration for a promise is valuable evidenceu
that the parties intended to make an agreement to which the law
should give effect, but it is only one sort of evidence and is not always
proof of the real intent of the parties. From time to time cases will
arise, such as this voluntary old age pension contract, where one who
made a promise, intending to be legally bound by it, is able to escape
from it at will by operation of the consideration rule.
The desirability and utility of the consideration rule in contracts
has been questioned frequently in the writings of legal theorists. This
criticism has been given a limited effect by the adoption of the Uni-
form Written Obligations Act by the legislatures of several states.,
As yet, however, the judicial feeling against the doctrine expresses
itself only in making additional exceptions to the general rule that
there can be no binding contract without consideration.
PAUL OBERST.
HOMICIDE-BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN DEFENSE IS INSANITY.
Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree for killing
his wife and child. The defense was insanity. He7d: where the de-
fendant pleads insanity and introduces evidence on the matter, the
burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is sane. Noelke v. State. ...... Ind ........ 15 N. E. (2d) 950
(1938).
In the past few years there has been an increased use of the de-
fense of insanity in criminal cases and out of these cases at least three
rules have arisen.'
The principal case represents the view taken by several courts.2
Such a rule places the entire burden of proving that the defendant
is sane upon the state. The Massachusetts's courts, while subscribing
to the rule that the state must prove the defendant sane, relieve part
of the burden of the rule by saying that the presumption that all men
" "I take it that the ancient notion about want of consideration was
for the sake of evidence only." Lord Mansfield in Pillans v. VanMierop,
3 Burr. 1663 (1765) (Discredited as historically inaccurate by Holds.
worth in Moddrn History of Consideration (1922), 2 B. U. L. Rev. 174,
190; but approved as a principle at 208.) "It can only properly be
treated, not as a test, but as an indication; an indication, but an indi-
cation only, amongst many others, that the parties entering into a
transaction had in contemplation their legal relations to each other."
Markby, Elements of Law (6th ed., 1905), 315. "There can be little
doubt however, that our law has shown itself too scrupulous in this
matter (danger of giving legal effect to unconsidered promises and
levities of speech); in other legal systems no such precaution is
known, and its absence seems to lead to no ill results.' Salmond,
Jurisprudence (7th ed., 1924), 374.
22Adopted by Pennsylvania in 1927, and Utah in 1929.
25 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed., 1923), Section 2051.
2 Blume v. State, 154 Ind. 343, 56 N. E. 771 (1900); Fritz v. State,
